This paper is the Software Hazard Analysis (SWHA) which will study the managerial process and the technical methode and techniques inherent in the performance of software safety task within the Military Aircraft System Safety program. This SWHA identifies potential hazardous effects on the software intensive systems and provides a comprehensive and qualitative assessment of the software safety. The purpose of this paper is to identify safety critical functions of software in Military A/C. The identified software hazards associated with the design or function will be evaluated for risks and operational constraint to further improve the software design requirement, analysis and testing efforts for safety critical software. This common SWHA, the first time analysis in KOREA, was review all avionics OFP(Operational Flight Program), and focus only on software segments which are safety critical. This paper provides a important understanding between the customer and developer as to how the software safety for the Military A/C will be accomplished. It will also provide the current best solution which may as one consider the necessary step in establishing a credible and cost-effective software safety program.
Software safety, an element of the system safety and software development process, can not be allowed to function independently of the total effort. Both simple and highly integrated multiple systems are experiencing an extraordinary growth in the use of computer and software to monitor and/or control safety critical subsystems of functions.
A SW specification error, design flow, or the lack of generic safety critical requirements can contribute to or cause a system failure or erroneous human decision. To achieve an acceptable level of safety for SW used in critical applications, Software Safety engineering must be given primary emphasis early in the requirements definition and system conceptual design process. Safety critical SW must receive continuos management and engineering analysis throughout the development and operational life cycle of the system. SW safety should optimize system safety in the design, development, use, and maintenance of SW system and their integration with safety critical hardware system in an operational environment. SW does not fail in the same manner as hardware. It does not wear out, or have increasing tolerance that result in failures. SW errors are generally errors in the requirements (failure to anticipate a set of conditions that lead to a hazard, or influences of an external component failure on the SW) or implementation errors (coding errors, incorrect interpretation of design requirements). If the conditions occur, the SW does not perform as expected and a failure occurs. [1] 78 (146) 전기전자학회 논문지 (Journal of IKEEE) Vol. 16. No.2 SW is generally application specific and reliability parameters associated with it cannot be estimated in the same manner as HW is. Development of SW to a SW level does not imply the assignment of a failure rate for that SW. Thus, the probability of SW failure based on reliability cannot be used by the general HW and system risk assessment process as can HW failure rate. Appling probability of this nature of SW, except in purely qualitative items are impractical. Therefore, reliability predictions become a prediction of when the specific condition will occur that cause it to fail. Without the ability to accurately predict a SW error occurrence, alternate methods of hazard categorization must be available when the hazard possesses SW causal factors. During the early phases of the system safety program and SW safety program as part of the SW development process, the prioritization and categorization of hazards is essential for the allocation of resources to the functional area possessing the highest risk potential. [2] This SWHA present a method of categorizing hazards having SW causal factors strictly for purpose of allocation of resources to the SW development process. This methodology does not provide an assessment of residual risk associated with the SW at the completion of development. However, the execution of the SW safety program, the development and analysis of SW safety requirements and the verification of their implementation in the final SW provide the basis for a qualitative assessment of the residual in traditional terms. The SWHA is an iterative qualitative process of determining safety requirements for SW intensive systems and can be used to help identify safety critical functions, safety critical SW, and general safety requirements or mitigation guidelines. The Fault Hazard Analysis(FHA) is an inductive and qualitative hazard-identifying, analytical tool that can be is used to determine SW hazard conditions, causes of these hazards, and resultant effects to the aircraft system and its operation. [3] FHA will be prepared in a columnar format for the SWHA. The SWHA is essentially a safety requirements analysis and not associated with the system and the probable causes to the critical hazards. In general, SW that is identified to be a catastrophic hazard cause is safety critical SW. SW bugs that reside in safety critical SW could potentially lead to a hazardous outcome. Unlike HW, the performance of SW is independent on the operating environment and the operating duration. Hence it is important to ensure that safety critical SW is as robust as possible. SW causes or contributions to hazards will be identified at the SW functional level (a SW functions out-of-time or out-of sequence, malfunctions, degrades in function, or does not respond appropriately to system stimuli). In SW intensive systems hazard occurrence will likely be caused by a combination of HW, SW and human errors. These complex initiation pathway will be analyzed for the purpose of identifying hazard mitigation requirements and/or constraints to the HW and SW design and test teams. SW safety is integral to The Total System Safety and The System Safety Engineering and SW Engineering should be responsible for the coordination with System Engineering to perform and document the analysis in accordance with the contractual requirements, if applicable.
2 . S oft ware R isk Ass es sme n t Safety critical SW is identified through SW hazard analysis based on the SW risk assessment process. The Software Risk Index(SRI) serves as a guide for the SW safety engineering, SW development and integrity process, and program management to accord the right amount of effort to ensure SW robustness of safety critical SW. Risk assessment of identified SW hazards will be conducted on the basis of the assigned SW failure condition (SW severity classification) and the SW's control capability or level within the context of the SW causal factors. This risk assessment will focus Note) The mishap severity categories are derived and interpreted from MIL-STD-882C and MIL-STD-882D(Appendix A, Table A-1) 4 . So ftw are Con tro l Cat eg ory ( SCC)
Software Risk assessment will not be assigned probability of SW failure occurrences. Due to the inherent of SW, the probability of occurrence for HW is an unsatisfactory methode of assessing SW risk. It is recognized that SW failure probability and their contribution to critical functional failures cannot be quantified. There are no techniques to verify SW against quantitative safety requirements. The verification of SW is carried out using a qualitative indicator, the SW development level, defined by most severe failure conditions. [1] There have been numerous methode of determining the SW's influence on system-level hazards. These do not specifically determine SW-caused hazard probabilities, but instead assess the SW's control capability or level within the context of the SW causal factors. One of the most popular is presented in MIL-STD-882C. In doing so, each SW causal factor can be labeled with a SW Control Category (SCC), given in Table 2 , for the purpose of helping to determine the degree of autonomy that the SW has on the hazardous event. Once identified, each safety-critical function should be assessed and categorized against the SCC to determine the level of control of the SW over safety-related functionality.
. So ftw are Ri sk I n de x ( SR I) Matrix
The key to developing most SW risk assessment is the characterization of SW risks. The Software Risk Index (SRI) Matrix is based solely upon the SW failure condition of the SW against the level of command or control the SW has safety-critical HW or system function. The matrix is established using the SW failure conditions for the rows and the SW control categories for the columns, see Table 3 . Assigning SRI numbers to each element completes the matrix. A SRI of '1' from the matrix implies that the safety risk is "very high" and requires more design and test rigor than SW with less safety risk. A SRI of '2' to '4' possesses lesser degree of safety risk and requires less design and test rigor than high-risk SW and/or requires acceptance from the managing activity. A common SWHA was perform to evaluate and to identify common safety critical function of SW in essential avionics system from KF-16/F-15K/FA-50. The findings will be used to obtain an initial risk assessment of a system, and to identify requisite hazard control and follow on mitigation actions. The identified SW hazards associated with the design or function will be evaluated for risks and operational constraint to further improve the SW design requirement, SW analysis and testing effort for critical SW. This analysis examines SW components at a gross level to obtain an initial SW safety evaluation of the SW system. In SW intensive, safety critical systems hazard occurrence will likely be caused by a combination of HW, SW, and human errors. These complex initiation pathways will be analyzed for the purpose of identifying hazard mitigation requirements and/or constraints to the HW and SW design and test teams. In case where the safety features are not adequate to eliminate or control a potential hazard, corrective action will be initiated and recommended for incorporation into the design. The analysis data presented in this study is based on the current configuration of KF-16/F-15K/ FA-50. Table 5 illustrates the status of identified individual SW, we call it OFP (Operational Flight Program) [6] 
. D et aile d Fu nc ti on al H azard A nal ysi s
The common SWHA present a detailed functional hazard analysis for each SW failure condition(Total 178). Refer to Table 4 'Sample SWHA Worksheet' illustrates detailed investigation of the SW function to identify the critical failure conditions, their inherent and aircraft operational effects within the design. Unlike the HW related Mishap Risk Index, a low Software Risk Index(SRI) number does not mean that a design is unacceptable. It just reflects the degree of SW control over the system and indicates that greater resources need to be applied to the analysis and testing of the SW and its interaction with the system. Simply, this SRI will determine the scope of development and verification plan for the safety related SW. The SRI matrix does not consider the likelihood of a SW caused hazard occurring in its assessment. However, through the successful implementation of a SW safety integrity process, the likelihood of SW contributing to a hazard occurrence will be greatly reduced. A SW risk assessment, as shown in Table 7 will be used to recommended or determine the scope of development and verification for the each subsystems SW. Assigning SRI numbers to each SW element completes the matrix. [10] • A SRI of '1' from the matrix implies that the SW exercises control over potentially catastrophic or critical HW system without intervention and safety risk is very high. This high risk category requires more significant safety design and test rigor than SW with less safety risk.
• A SRI of '2' to '4' from the matrix implies that the SW control of catastrophic to marginal hazard is reduced or SW controls less significant hazards. These subsystems SW possesses lesser degrees of safety risk and requires less design and test rigor A Study of Software Hazard Analysis for Safety Critical Function in Military Aircraft than high risk SW. However, safety design and in depth testing is required and it requires acceptance from the managing activity.
• A SRI of '5' from the matrix implies that the SW control non critical HW system or does not provide safety critical information. Low level safety analysis and/or testing are required. Table 7 . Suggested Criteria for avionics OFP I V Co n c lus io n System Safety performing the SW requirement hazard analysis will accomplished the SW safety analysis task. This task ensures that SW is considered in its contribution to hazard occurrence. This task should be defined and common to overall system safety program. Software Hazard Analysis (SWHA) for the SW subsystems has been accomplished to investigate the critical failure conditions, their inherent and aircraft operational effect within the design This comon SWHA can be used to help identify in Military A/C :
• Safety Critical Software Function • Safety Criticality of each OFP • General Safety Requirement or Mitigation Also, through this risk assessment will be used to recommended or determine the scope of development and verification for the each avionics OFP. This study will be good reference to make SW development plan for next generation Korea Fighter Development Program. R e fe r e n ce s
